B49 Network Rail Shared Learning NRL25-02 Derailment of freight train at Audenshaw

Derailment of freight train at Audenshaw

Issued to: Network Rail managers, safety professional and accredited contractors
Ref: NRL25-02
Location: Audenshaw, Manchester
Date of issue: 09/06/2025
Contact: Ellen Wintle, Chief Regional Engineer, NW&C or Chris Bibby, Regional Engineer, P-Way, NW&C

Overview

At around 11:25 on 6 September 2024, a freight train travelling between Peak Forest and Salford derailed as it passed over Sidmouth Street bridge in Audenshaw, Manchester. The train was made up of 2 class 66 locomotives and 24 wagons fully loaded with aggregate. The 2 locomotives and the leading 10 wagons passed safely over the
bridge, but the following 9 wagons derailed, with the remaining wagons coming to a stand on the bridge itself.
No injuries were caused as a result of the derailment but substantial damage was caused to railway infrastructure and some of the wagons.
The track over Sidmouth Street underbridge No. 3 is supported by a Longitudinal Timber Bearer System (LBS) and has a sub 800m radius curve. Investigations to date suggest that the derailment was caused by gauge spread of the track which occurred when the baseplate chair screws sheared and broke.

Underlying Causes

• The chair screws in the baseplates were the wrong type. For hardwood timbers they should have been high

  tensile screws (marked as HT) as per NR/L2/TRK/3038.

• The chair screws used were too short for the depth of packing between the baseplate and the timbers.

  Screws marked AS had been fitted which are 160mm long (6 5/16 inch). They should have been LSA screws

  as these are 206mm long (8 3/8 inch),

• There was no signed Longitudinal Bearer Management Plan in place – this should have been produced,

  approved and signed by both Track and Structures engineers as per TEF3279.

• Ellipse was not being used as required by NR/L3/MTC/MG0176. Specifically, Ellipse had not been populated

  to record previous incidents when screws had sheared and been replaced. Recording in Ellipse is vital so that

  similar or repeat incidents can be identified to allow any ‘trends’ to identified and mitigated.

• Track geometry trace reviews had not been undertaken in accordance with NR/L2/TRK/001 mod 11.

• There had been several staffing changes in the maintenance team in the months prior to the derailment

  and the handover of high-risk assets between TMEs had not been sufficiently recorded.

• Assurance processes had not picked up the issues above.